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Some Fundamental Issues 
qffjhe Present War 



By 
William Dillon 






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Some Fundamental Issues 
of the Present War 



By 
William Dillon 



R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY 
CHICAGO 






COPYRIGHT, igi5 
BY 

WILLIAM DILLON 



MAR -5 1915 

©CI A -39386 2 



Some Fundamental Issues of the 
^ Present War 

By William Dillon 

SINCE the outbreak of the present war in Europe, there has 
already been created quite a hterature in England and in 
Germany treating of the causes of the war and the merits of 
the controversy as between the parties to it. Studying this liter- 
ature, one is at once impressed by two facts: one sees very clearly 
(i) that in such a crisis as this, education, culture and mental train- 
ing, even of the highest kind, count for little or nothing as against 
strong national sentiment; and (2) that it is almost, if not quite, im- 
possible in such a crisis as this to find a man who can and will judge 
the issues involved from an absolutely judicial and purely intellectual 
standpoint. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that the man who 
can and will judge in such a way the issues of such a controversy is 
little short of a monstrosity. 

All English writers — men of letters, scientists, philosophers — 
almost without exception, are intensely convinced that, in this war, 
England is morally right and Germany is morally wrong; that it is 
for the best interests of civilization that the Allies should win; and 
that the blame for the war and for all the horrors that go with it lies 
at the door of Germany and not at the door of England. On the 
other hand, all the highest and most cultured minds in Germany 
believe with equal intensity the direct opposite of all this. They 
lay all the blame upon England and Russia and they pray God to 
defend the right with the most absolute conviction as to where the 
right lies. 

Reading a few of the articles which have appeared in the leading 
daily and weekly papers and the leading periodicals of America and 
in the leading periodicals of England, I find myself constantly asking 
myself: Is it possible to get to the bottom of this question? Has 
it any bottom? Is it possible to lay down any fundamental propo- 
sitions having more or less bearing upon the rights and wrongs 
of this war to which the great majority of relatively fair-minded men 

I 



2 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

will yield assent? I say relatively fair-minded, because in such a 
case, as intimated above, absolute fair-mindedness is not to be looked 
for. And, by a relatively fair-minded man I mean a man who, 
relatively to the average man, is more influenced by reason and less 
influenced by national sentiment or passion. 

In the discussion which follows, I select England and Germany 
as the protagonists on either side for the reason that they clearly 
are the principals in the literary duel referred to at the beginning of 
this paper. France, Russia and Austria have no doubt had much 
to say for themselves in their respective papers and periodicals. 
But of the war literature in these countries, we in America are rela- 
tively ignorant. 

Let me begin by putting aside, with very brief comment, some 
issues which have been much discussed in the literature above re- 
ferred to, but which have little direct bearing upon the fundamental 
issues which I propose to here discuss. 

I. As regards the question of the proximate cause of the present 
war, and the question of what Germany could have done in the 
way of preventing this cause from producing its eff^ect: — 

A great deal has been said as regards the Austrian ultimatum 
to Servia; as to the extremely drastic character of that ultimatum; 
as to the unreasonableness of the time limit imposed; and as to what 
Germany might have done in the direction of causing the modifica- 
tion of Austria's demands without either herself making, or advising 
her ally to make, any humiliating concession. 

The impression produced on my mind by reading the English 
white book, and the German white (or blue) book, and by getting 
such knowledge as I could get at second hand of the French yellow 
book, is that Germany could have prevented the war from breaking 
out when it did break out, and could have done this without unduly 
humiliating either herself or her ally. But back of all this there 
lies the fact that the ruling classes in Germany believed that this 
war was bound to come in the near future; they believed that the 
powers of the Entente were determined to have it out with Germany 
and to destroy her military predominance when they saw the oppor- 
tunity to be favorable; that within the next few years a time would 
probably come when conditions would be more favorable to the 
powers of the Entente than they were just then; and that, therefore, 
Germany's most eff'ective way of defending herself was to attack 
when she was ready and they were not. If this belief rested on 
strong grounds — and I think it did — it is plain that Germany might 
have admitted, had she seen fit to do so, that she had elected to strike 



OF THE PRESENT WAR 3 

there and then, and might yet have consistently contended that she 
was in a sense fighting a war of self-defense. If the leading apolo- 
gists for Germany had elected to rest her case on this ground, instead 
of insisting that the sword was forced into her hand at this par- 
ticular time, she would, in my opinion, have stood better with the 
neutral powers than she does today. 

I may here turn aside so far as to say that the wisdom of 
Germany's decision to strike there and then would probably have 
been fully justified by the event, had it not been that, in two im- 
portant respects, she miscalculated. She calculated that England 
would stay out and that Italy would come in. In each case she 
had grounds for her calculation; but in each case the event turned 
out against her. 

2. As regards the contention that England was justified in 
going into this war because of the violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium by Germany: — 

Careful reading of the English and German white books has 
convinced me of two things; namely, (i) that during the interval 
which elapsed between the deliverance of the Austrian ultimatum 
and the declaration of war by England, Sir Edward Grey did his 
best to prevent a general war, and to preserve the peace of Europe; 
and (2) that during all this time he was determined that, if there 
was to be a war between Germany and Austria on the one side and 
France and Russia on the other, England would go in on the side of 
France and Russia, if he could at all manage to bring that to pass. 
He had reached this determination before there was any talk of 
the violation of Belgium's neutrality. He had reached it, firstly, 
because he believed that it would be a cowardly and a base thing for 
England to stand by and let France be destroyed by Germany in 
view of what had taken place between France and England during 
the past few years; and, secondly, because he believed that, if Eng- 
land did this thing, she would not have a friend left in Europe when 
the war was over; and that, after France had been crushed, England's 
turn would come next. 

What the violation of Belgium's neutrality really did for Sir 
Edward Grey and the party he represented in the ministry was 
this: it enabled him to go into the war with a united country be- 
hind him. 

Down to the time of the declaration by Germany of her intention 
to go through Belgium, there was a strong peace party in England and 
a strong peace party in the ministry. Even after the announcement 
of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality, two prominent 
members of the Cabinet resigned rather than consent to the war. 
Sir Edward Grey would almost certainly have succeeded in dragging 



4 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

England into the war in any event; but if it had not been for Ger- 
many's action in regard to Belgium, half of the Cabinet would have 
resigned and the situation in England and in Ireland would have 
been very different from what it is today. 

I may note here that there is another, and perhaps a more im- 
portant, way in which the treatment of Belgium by Germany has 
helped the Allies. It has secured for them the sympathy of the 
majority in the neutral nations. There is a widespread belief in this 
country that the extreme severity of Germany's treatment of 
Belgium in the matter of killing non-combatants and in the matter 
of destroying property, is by no means entirely due, as claimed, to 
the desire to punish and put a stop to the practice of sniping from 
houses or other places of concealment. There is a widespread belief 
that this extreme severity is largely due to a desire on the part of 
Germany to punish and to get even with Belgium for daring to defend 
her neutrality by force, and for thereby contributing very materially 
to the defeat of Germany's main aim at the opening of the war — 
to smash France in the first few weeks by a swift and staggering 
blow. There is a widespread belief that Germany desired by a 
terrible lesson to cause the Belgians to realize that, in relying on the 
help of England and France as against the might of Germany, they 
were relying on a broken reed. 

This belief may be just or it may be unjust. It exists; and it 
has largely contributed to determining the sympathy of a majority 
of the people of this country. 

But, whether Germany was or was not guilty of an indefensible 
act in this matter; whether she was or was not guilty of a blunder 
in using force after Belgium had refused to allow her to pass through, 
I cannot concede that England has the right to justify her going 
into this war on the ground of Germany's treatment of Belgium, when, 
as a matter of fact, England would have gone into this war, as the 
ally of France, if Germany had never attacked Belgium at all. 

3. As regards the abuse heaped on England by Germany and 
on Germany by England: — 

If it were not for the whole business being so terribly tragic, 
there would be something ludicrous in the way in which these two 
nations have been abusing one another for doing that which, as 
impliedly admitted, the abusing nation would not have hesitated one 
moment to do herself under similar circumstances. Decisive superi- 
ority of land power is, as things are in Europe, a matter of life and 
death for Germany. England abuses Germany for insisting on 
such superiority. Decisive superiority of sea power is, as things 
are in Europe, a matter of life and death for England. Germany 
abuses England for insisting on such superiority. 



OF THE PRESENT WAR 5 

Take the controversy at present raging regarding England's 
policy of using her sea power to starve out Germany. Germans 
passionately and fiercely denounce England for this pohcy. It is 
natural that they should do so. The pohcy of starving women and 
children and adult male non-combatants, in order to compel the 
submission of male combatants, is a savage pohcy. But I am only 
concerned here with the question of the consistency of either party 
in abusing the other. Upon this question it is in point to ask whether, 
in view of the treatment of Belgium and the excuse by which that 
treatment was attempted to be justified, and in view of the German 
pohcy of bombarding from air ships or sea ships undefended towns 
not having in them any stores or factories of war material, any man 
not bhnded by partisan passion believes that, if Germany held the 
command of the sea, she would hesitate one moment to use that 
advantage as ruthlessly as England is using it for the purpose of com- 
pelling the submission of her adversary? 

4. It is hardly necessary to add that I put aside as more than 
irrelevant stories of wanton and purposeless cruelty and of outrage 
by German soldiers in Belgium. Even the best disciplined army has 
a small percentage of brutes in it; but, unless in this sense, no one, 
except extreme partisans, beheves these stories. 

The fundamental issues which I shall discuss have reference 
to the following questions: (i) In what way may the conditions 
which have made possible in Europe such a horrible catastrophe 
as the present war be best ended.? Accepting the term *' militarism" 
as descriptive of these conditions, will this mihtarism be better ended 
by a victory of the Allies or by a victory of the Germans? and 
(2) Which is better for the future of the human race — that the type of 
social organization and government which obtains in England and 
in France or the type which obtains in Germany should in future 
be the prevailing type in Europe? 

A great deal has been written on the question as to which of 
the nations of Europe is to blame for the existence of this mihtarism 
as it exists today. England and France emphatically declare that 
the blame must rest entirely upon Germany. There is a sense in 
which this is true and a sense in which it is not true. It is true 
that the Germans have taken the lead in Europe in devising and 
elaborating this modern system of preparing for and waging war; 
but it is not true that, in so doing, under the circumstances in which 
they found themselves, they have done anything which necessarily 
calls for blame. Whether it does in fact call for blame depends on 
the motive. 



6 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

In the years which followed the Franco-German war of 1870, 
Germany found herself in a position of peculiar danger. On the one 
side of her was France pledged to a policy of hate and revenge until 
her lost provinces should be restored to her. On the other side was 
Russia, whose friendship France was eagerly courting, and whose 
friendship France was more than likely to ultimately secure owing 
to the deep-seated antipathy between the Slav and the Teuton. 
Germany realized that the great position which she had won for 
herself in Europe could only be made secure by her developing a 
military strength easily greater than that of France or Russia alone, 
and sufficient to enable her to fight at least a defensive war success- 
fully against France and Russia combined. She realized at the 
same time that in the character of her people she had an asset which 
gave her in several respects great advantages over her rivals. The 
German people have a special faculty for dealing patiently, minutely 
and thoroughly with details. Now, war, as it exists today, is a 
most complicated business, in which endless matters of minute 
detail have to be carefully and methodically attended to as a con- 
dition precedent to success. The English have just one man who ap- 
proaches the great Germans in this faculty; and they have wisely 
made that man their minister of war. 

Again, Prussia is ruled by an aristocracy which is the most com- 
petent aristocracy in any of the states of modern Europe, and which 
is perhaps the most competent aristocracy the world has ever known 
since the Roman Patricians in the days when Rome was conquering 
the world. The common people in Prussia have come to have an 
absolute confidence in the capacity of these aristocratic leaders to 
lead them in war, or in the matter of preparing for war. The in- 
stinct of the common people of Prussia is to follow and to obey those 
whom they regard as their natural leaders rather than to insist on 
thinking and acting for themselves. And the same is true in a lesser 
degree of the other states which make up the German Empire. 

By making the very most of these characteristics in the German 
people, the governing class in Germany has been able to create a war 
machine, as it is called, far exceeding in perfection of detail and in 
perfection of discipline any which England or France had created, 
or could create in time of peace. 

The condition which renders this elaborate armament excusable 
as a measure of self-defense is the condition commonly known as the 
balance of power in Europe. This condition has existed for more 
than three hundred years. For the first century and a half or so 
there were four great powers. Then, about the middle of the eight- 
eenth century, Prussia came in and made five. And towards the 
close of the nineteenth century Italy came in and made six. It has 



OF THE PRESENT WAR 7 

been the rule during all this time, whenever one of the great powers 
attained to a position of marked predominance, that the others 
should combine to pull down the power so predominating. And 
then the only way in which the predominant power could defend 
itself was to predominate still more. It was so one hundred years 
ago with France under Napoleon. It is so today with Germany. 
That Germany has attained to this position of marked predomi- 
nance is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that for the past six 
months she has been fighting three of the great powers of Europe and 
holding her own against all of them. 

But no sooner had the German ruling class perfected their fight- 
ing machine than they began to realize the fact that they had im- 
posed upon their country a burden greater than she could long con- 
tinue to bear. For, whatever may be our opinion as to where the 
blame for this militarism ought to rest- — whether we lay it upon the 
German people, or upon a condition for which the German people 
cannot fairly be held responsible, — that the thing is an intolerable 
evil few would question. Looking at the situation which exists 
today in Europe, one is prompted to ask in deadly earnest the question 
which Mr. Bret Harte asks in jest in his well-known poem, "Is 
civilization a failure or is the Caucasian played out.?" 

Not only has this militarism made possible the horrors that we 
see in Europe today, but, even in time of peace, it has imposed upon 
the nations a burden so heavy that France and Germany and, perhaps 
to a lesser extent, the others were upon the high road to bankruptcy. 

The urgent problem for the German ruling class, then, came to 
be — How is the condition which renders this armament necessary 
to be brought to a close.? And the only answer they could see, or 
cared to see, was — By making the predominance of Germany so 
decisive that a much lesser degree of armament will suffice to main- 
tain that predominance. Hence the passionate earnestness with 
which the German apologists affirm that no permanent peace is 
possible except upon the basis of a decisive German victory. Napo- 
leon had the same problem to face a century ago, and he answered 
it in the same way. During the past twenty-five years, England 
has made several overtures to Germany with a view of arriving at 
some agreement for the limitation of armament, and especially of 
naval armament. Two conferences were held at the Hague for this 
object, but they came to nothing. In both cases the failure was due 
to the position taken by Germany. The German Emperor and 
the German statesmen professed to believe, and probably did honestly 
believe, that such schemes were quixotic and impracticable. They 
may have been impracticable then; but it by no means follows that 
they are impracticable now. 



8 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

I have read carefully all the statements of the German case that 
I have been able to lay my hands upon, — the Appeal to the Civilized 
World by the German professors, the Appeal of the German Uni- 
versities, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg's book, and the letters and 
articles by eminent Germans which are printed in part i of the New 
York Times' Current History of the European War. Over and 
over again, in these publications I find these two propositions pas- 
sionately affirmed: — 

(i) That Germany, assuming her motive to be strictly defensive, 
is in no sense to blame for the organization of her tremendous and 
elaborate war machine; that, situated as she was, no other course 
was open to her, unless she was content to lie down and let her avowed 
enemies trample on her with impunity; and 

(2) That her motive was strictly and exclusively defensive; 
that there was no thought or intention of aggression, or of establish- 
ing by force a predominance over the other nations of Europe. 

The first proposition I believe to be true; the second proposition 
I believe to be false. I believe that the ruling class in Germany, 
if not the mass of the German people, had the will to dominate; 
and that they meant to execute that will by the only way by which 
it could be executed — that is, by superior force. And I believe that 
they justified to themselves this will to dominate by the argu- 
ment which I have suggested above; by this argument and by that 
of "manifest destiny." 

This is really the kernel of the whole argument. If the second 
proposition be as true as the first, then Germany is justified. If 
the second proposition be false, then the other nations of Europe had 
the same right to defend themselves that Germany had to defend 
herself; and to defend themselves by attack, if attack was the best 
available means of defense. 

For, paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that, in 
this case, each side is waging a war of defense. Germany is de- 
fending herself against the French will to take back Alsace and 
Lorraine; against the Russian will to dominate the Balkan peninsula; 
against the will of all three allies to destroy her military superiority. 
The Allies are defending themselves against the German will to 
dominate Europe, and against the constant menace to them implied 
in the tremendous military organization by which that will to dom- 
inate was to be made effective. 

Upon this question I merely state my conclusion without giving 
my reasons. I do not expect the assent of all relatively fair-minded 
men to this particular conclusion. What I here affirm has been 
vigorously denied by all the German writers since the war whom I 
have read, with two exceptions; and, no doubt, it will continue to be 



OF THE PRESENT WAR 9 

denied by them. Of German writers before the war it would be 
easy to name quite a number who have frankly avowed and boldly 
defended the German will to dominate. 

In the ghastly horror of the present situation in Europe there is 
just one gleam of hope: that this war may prove to be a war to end 
war; that, having demonstrated what a hideous thing war has come 
to be in these our days, it may incite those taking part in it to a des- 
perate resolve that somehow and somewhere the remedy must be 
found. 

There are just two ways in which the remedy may be found, 
and only two so far as I can see. The condition may be remedied 
by a decisive preponderance of one of the great powers over the others; 
by the setting up in modern Europe of a system resembling the 
Roman Empire — if not the empire of the Caesars, at least the Empire 
of Otto the Great and Frederick Barbarossa. Or it may be ended, 
without any such decisive preponderance, by the setting up in Europe 
of a tribunal which shall decide international questions, including 
questions of the limitation of armament, and whose decisions all 
the great powers shall pledge themselves to enforce. Or, if this be 
still impracticable, then at least a tribunal to which the powers will 
bind themselves to submit their controversies before they fight. 

If Germany wins decisively, the problem will be solved in the 
first way. If the Allies win decisively, it may, and probably will, 
be solved in the second way. If the war ends in a draw, or nearly 
in a draw, I see but Httle hope; although, even then, it is still possi- 
ble that the problem may be solved in the second way. 

I express no opinion here as to which would be the better solu- 
tion. I am content, on this branch of the discussion, to reach and 
emphasize the conclusion that those who desire and hope for the 
first solution should, other things being equal, sympathize with 
Germany; while those who desire and hope for the second solution 
should, other things being equal, sympathize with the Allies. 

So much for the first of the two issues to which I said that my 
fundamental propositions would have reference. Now as to the 
second. 

Our school histories tell us that, so far back as we know the history 
of the human race, civilized states have been governed by some 
one of three types of government, namely: (i) autocracy, or the 
personal government of an individual; (2) oligarchy, or govern- 
ment of the masses by the classes; and (3) democracy, or govern- 
ment of the people by the people, either directly or through rep- 
resentatives. 



lo SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

According to a certain school of political thinkers, of whom the 
late Mr. Carlyle was the prophet while he lived, government, to 
deserve the name, must be either of the first or of the second type; 
it must be government of the incompetent by the competent; of those 
who do not know by those who do. 

All three of these forms of government existed in the little states 
into which Greece was divided four hundred years before the Christian 
Era; and we' have abundant evidence in the pages of Thucydides 
that the arguments for and against these three forms of government 
were more familiar to the average Athenian of the age of Pericles 
than they are to the average American of today. 

The experience of the human race in bygone times has abundantly 
demonstrated that in the matter of efficiency in the waging of war 
and the getting ready for war, the three kinds of government just 
specified rank in the order in which I have named them. The ideal 
government for the successful waging of war is autocracy, where 
the autocrat happens to be also a great soldier. This truth was 
exemplified in ancient times by Persia under Cyrus, by Greece under 
Alexander, and by Rome under Julius Caesar and Trajan. It has 
been exemplified in modern times by Prussia under Frederick and by 
France under Napoleon. 

Next, and a close second, in the matter of efficiency in the waging 
of war, comes oligarchy, where the ruling class happens to be ex- 
ceptionally competent. This truth was exemplified in ancient times 
by Rome, while Rome was conquering the world. Rome was then 
governed by her senate, and her senate consisted exclusively of her 
patricians, the haughtiest and the most competent oligarchy that 
the world has ever known. I may turn aside here to note that Rome 
is the only country we know of which has been able to combine the 
advantages, in this regard, of autocracy and oligarchy by the ex- 
pedient of naming a dictator in times of special danger to the state; 
an expedient which no state of modern Europe has dared to imitate. 
This truth was again exemplified in the later middle ages by Venice, 
where the oUgarchy of successful merchants was again specially 
competent. It has once more been exemplified in our own time by 
Prussia and the German Empire. 

Last, and a long way behind either of the others, in the matter 
of efficiency in the waging of and preparing for war, comes democracy. 
To cite the cases in which this truth has been exemplified would be 
to cite the case of every experiment in democracy the human race 
has ever made from Athens down to the United States of America. 
The case of France in the years which immediately followed the great 
Revolution is so obviously exceptional as to call for no explanation. 

It is hardly necessary to say that, in admitting the decisive in- 



OF THE PRESENT WAR ii 

feriority of democracy in the matter of waging war, I am not giving 
away the case for democracy. Waging war is not the only object, 
or even the principal object, of government. Democracy has its 
advantages and its compensations; but there is no use in claiming 
for it something which it certainly does not have. 

Now, of the three powers of Europe engaged in the present war 
which lead the others in civilization and progress, England and France 
have the third of the three types of government above specified and 
Germany has the second. Down to the year 1832 the English gov- 
ernment might fairly have been described as an oligarchy, tempered 
by the power of a House of Commons which represented the upper 
middle classes, but which was not in any sense representative of the 
masses of the people. By the great Reform Act of 1832, England 
took a long step towards democracy. By the reform acts of 1867 
and 1884, and quite recently by the statute aboHshing the veto 
power of the House of Lords, the transition to democracy was made 
complete. The present government of England may, with approxi- 
mate accuracy, be defined as being in form a monarchy and in sub- 
stance a democracy. The government of France is democratic 
in form and in substance. The government of the German Empire 
may, with approximate accuracy, be defined as being an oligarchy, 
or government of the masses by the classes, modified in one direc- 
tion by a Umited amount of autocratic power in the Emperor, and 
modified in the other direction, so far as regards internal affairs, by 
a limited amount of popular or representative power in the Reichstag. 

To justify this definition would call for a more extended examina- 
tion of the constitution of the German Empire than I can make here. 
It would be necessary to explain the constitution and powers of 
the Bundesrat, or Upper House of the Imperial Parliament, a body 
of which we hear little or nothing in this country because its sessions 
are secret. It would be necessary to explain the peculiar franchise 
upon which the members of the Reichstag are elected, and to note 
the strict limitations imposed upon the powers of that body in regard 
to foreign affairs and military organization. And what is perhaps 
most important, it would be necessary to explain the way in which 
the executive officers, of all ranks, are appointed. Those who care 
to test the general accuracy of my definition can easily look up these 
matters for themselves. 

Perhaps at no time in the history of the world has the vast su- 
periority of an oligarchy over a democracy in the matter of preparing 
for and waging war been more strikingly demonstrated than it has 
been in the case of the present war. As noted above, Germany is 
not only governed by an oligarchy; she is governed by a very excep- 
tionally competent oligarchy. And what has been the result? We 



12 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

know from what has actually happened, — and, as the French proverb 
says, "There is nothing so brutal as a fact," — that Germany was 
ready to the minutest detail. We are not yet through marveling 
at the perfection of her wonderful fighting machine and at the rapidity 
with which she was able to bring that machine into full and perfect 
action. And what of England and France? Is not our wonder at 
Germany's readiness all but equaled by our wonder at their unreadi- 
ness? Every time that military men in France or in England urged 
upon their countrymen the need to do the things that Germany was 
doing, were they not met and baffled by the eloquence of some popular 
orator in the Legislative Assembly or the House of Commons who 
thought he understood the whole situation a great deal better than 
they did? Was not that wonderful argument which is being used 
with such effect in this country today, used there also with equal 
effect — the argument which affirms that the best way to prevent a 
powerful and unscrupulous enemy from attacking you is to leave 
yourself absolutely at his mercy? 

Do we not know that, despite the precious delay procured for 
France and England by Belgium, Germany came within an ace of 
repeating her performance of 1870; that she barely missed destroy- 
ing the French and English armies and taking Paris during the first 
few weeks of the war; and that she would probably have done this, 
had it not been for the promptness with which Russia hurried her 
troops into East Prussia, before she was ready to sustain such an 
invasion, and thereby relieved the situation at the western end of 
the war? If the Alhes win this war in the end, it will be because 
the superior staying power of England and of Russia will have been 
given time to come into play by a combination of happenings in the 
early weeks which Germany could not have been expected to foresee. 

It is obvious, therefore, that, whatever may be the ultimate 
issue of this war, the lesson which it teaches with regard to the com- 
parative efficiency of oligarchies and democracies in the matter of 
waging war is the same lesson which history has so often taught 
before. 

If Germany wins this war, in face of the odds against her, by the 
sheer force of the capacity of her ruling class and the consequent 
efficiency of her fighting machine, democracy in Europe as a form 
of government will be thoroughly discredited. The form of govern- 
ment in England, or what is left of England's empire, may or may 
not be changed; it probably will be changed to some little extent. 
The form of government in France, or what is left of France, may 
or may not be changed; it probably will be changed to a more or less 
sweeping extent. But the general result will be as I have stated. 
The prevailing type of government in Europe for many years to 



OF THE PRESENT WAR 13 

come will be the government of the many by the few, of the masses 
by the classes. The tendency towards democracy in those countries 
which now have the oligarchical form of government will be decisively 
checked. 

I therefore affirm, as the second of my fundamental propositions, 
that those who believe in the democratic form of government, and 
desire to see that as the prevailing type amongst the nations of Europe, 
should, other things being equal, sympathize with the Allies; while 
those who believe in the oligarchical form of government, and desire 
to see that form prevail in Europe, should, other things being equal, 
sympathize with the Germans. 

Here again I emphasize the fact that the proposition which I 
lay down does not pretend to be decisive. Before the proposition 
just affirmed can be decisive of the question as to which side we ought 
to sympathize with, we must first say which is the better form of 
government, — a question which I do not attempt to answer here. 

It may be that, back of these issues, there is a deeper and more 
fundamental issue — the issue of the individual against the state; 
the question which lies at the root of government and social or- 
ganization — whether the state exists for the individual or the in- 
dividual for the state. 

In the civilized communities of the ancient world, the state was 
everything and the individual relatively nothing. Then, after the 
downfall of the Roman Empire, the pendulum swung to the opposite 
extreme. With the wild warriors who issued from the forests of 
Germany to conquer the provinces of Rome, the individual was 
everything and the state relatively nothing. It seems a curious 
irony of fate that, in modern Europe, the country from which these 
warriors came should stand forth as the champion of the principle 
which they then overthrew. Yet so it is. In the Europe of today, 
the mighty German nation is the great representative of the principle 
of paternalism in government. As against her England stands as 
the great representative of individualism. In no respect is this more 
strikingly exemplified than in regard to that very militarism of which 
we hear so much today. The state is everything, says Germany in 
effect, and for the sake of the state the individual must submit to 
being made a soldier against his will and to being forced to fight 
for his country. As the late Mr. Labouchere once put it, wittily if 
not quite justly, the common people of Germany submit to being 
bullied by their ruling class, in order that they may be able to bully 
their neighbors. The Englishman, on the contrary, has, hitherto, 
obstinately and at every risk, asserted his right to individual choice 
in this matter. No amount of entreaty or warning by those best 



14 SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 

fitted to judge has been able to change his determination in this 
respect. Of all the great armies now battling in Europe, the English 
army is the only one in which every man can truly say that he is a 
soldier by his own free choice. It is impossible to deny that this 
paternalism — this strong assertion of the state as against the indi- 
vidual — has given to Germany in many respects immense advantages. 
It has made her, in many respects, the best governed country in 
the world. Yet there is something to be said for individualism. 
It may be, after all, that the submitting to be bullied by one's ruling 
class is too high a price to pay even for the privilege of bullying one's 
neighbors. 

I am not, of course, ignorant that the advocates of either side 
contend that there is a deeper and a greater issue than any which 
I have discussed, and even than that which I have lastly hinted at 
above: the issue of right against wrong, of justice against injustice. 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, each side passionately asserts 
the justice of its cause. The mighty German nation, — the champions 
of the Allies assure us, — with its tremendous and terrible fighting 
machine, is the great asserter in the Europe of today of the principle 
for which Rome stood in the Europe of twenty centuries ago. Ger- 
mans, they tell us, or at least the ruling class in Germany, adopt as 
their rule of conduct the maxim that might is right. They believe 
that the good old rule, *'Let him take that hath the power, and 
let him keep who can," sufficeth the use of every man as fully 
today as it did in the days of old. Their formula for measuring 
the duty which they owe to the smaller and weaker nations is the 
old Roman formula, — 

Parcere subjectis et dehellare superbos. 

Upon issues such as this, I express no opinion here, except to the 
limited extent implied in what is said above as to the German will 
to dominate. It would be futile to hope that, upon such issues, there 
could be, under present conditions, any agreemertt even of the rela- 
tively fair-minded. There has been, and there will be, while this war 
lasts, passionate affirmance on the one side and passionate denial on 
the other. No amount of argument, upon which this affirmance or 
this denial may be rested, will bring the contending parties any nearer 
to an agreement. 



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